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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1422 
_____________ 
 
JOHN L. BUDZASH, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HOWELL TOWNSHIP; PATRICIA HOOVER, Code Enforcement Officer; JAMES 
BURDICK, Code Enforcement Officer; CHRISTIAN JACKSON, Code Enforcement 
Officer; ROBERT GRIETZ, Howell Prosecutor; 1-20 JANE AND JOHN DOES, 
Individuals who participated with named defendants in this matter 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court  No. 3-08-cv-02583) 
District Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 8, 2011 
 
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 17, 2011) 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
  
Appellant John L. Budzash, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the 
United States District Court dismissing his civil rights claims as time-barred and 
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declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over various New Jersey state law 
claims.1
Budzash filed his original pro se complaint on May 27, 2008, naming  as 
defendants his neighbor Richard Bjornsen, several Howell Township employees, a 
municipal court judge and the municipal court, a state prosecutor, the Howell Township 
Police Department, and various Jane and John Does.  With the assistance of counsel, an 
amended complaint was filed on November 14, 2008.  In an order dated May 11, 2009, 
the District Court dismissed with prejudice the claims against the municipal court and the 
municipal court judge.   A second amended complaint (hereafter referred to as the 
Complaint) was filed on June 1, 2009, identifying as defendants Howell Township, code 
enforcement officers Patricia Hoover, James Burdick, and Christian Jackson, Howell 
prosecutor Robert Greitz, neighbor Richard Bjornsen, and Jane and John Does.   
  We will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
 At the heart of Budzash’s complaint is that his neighbor Bjornsen is friends with 
both Burdick, who is a code enforcement officer and part-time police officer, and 
Hoover, another code enforcement officer, and that they are violating his civil rights 
because of his association with Tony Fulton, who is an African-American.  Allegedly, in 
August of 2002, after Bjornsen saw Fulton on Budzash’s property, Bjornsen called 
Burdick.  Burdick then drove by Bjornsen’s property and issued a “junk vehicle” citation 
to Budzash.  In August of 2003, after Bjornsen again observed Fulton on Budzash’s 
                                                 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have final order 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a district court’s dismissal of an 
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property, Burdick issued another “junk vehicle” citation to Budzash.  By November of 
2003, Burdick had issued 12 more code citations.  According to the Complaint, other 
property owners were issued citations for code violations after Fulton was observed on 
their property.    Budzash opposed the code citations, and made requests under the Open 
Public Records Act (OPRA) to discover information to support his defense.  He also 
alleged that Hoover filed a baseless stalking charge against him after learning of his 
OPRA request.  Although Budzash was initially found liable on the citations, he 
eventually succeeded in having “all but one of the alleged violations” reversed. 
In addition to the above allegations, Budzash averred that, in February of 2007, he 
filed a complaint with the Howell Township Police Department alleging harassment by 
Bjornsen.  Hoover was allegedly present when he filed the complaint.  After departing the 
station, Budzash stopped on the side of the road to check his vehicle because he noticed 
the odor of antifreeze.  Burdick passed by Budzash while he was stopped.  Thereafter, a 
Howell Township Police Officer issued a citation to Budzash for “failure to maintain 
lane.”  
According to the Complaint, in March of 2008, Bjornsen again allegedly observed 
Fulton on Budzash’s property.  Budzash filed his original complaint in the District Court 
on May 27, 2008.  Two months later, Budzash received a citation for violating the 
Township’s soil removal ordinance.  This citation proceeded to municipal court.  
According to Budzash, Bjornsen had not been required to obtain the “soil fill” permit 
                                                                                                                                                             
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is de novo.  Phillips v. Cnty. of 
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even though he constructed a drainage ditch onto Budzash’s property.  Budzash’s efforts 
to discover information under the OPRA were again ignored.  Furthermore, between 
2006 and 2008, Bjornsen threw debris and rubbish on Budzash’s property and entered his 
property without permission.   
 Count I of Budzash’s complaint alleges that “[s]tarting in 2002 and continuing 
through the present,” Bjornsen and the municipal defendants have engaged in a 
continuing pattern of violating his rights under both the United States Constitution and 
the New Jersey Constitution “due to his affiliation with Tony Fulton an African 
American and/or in retaliation for attempting to access the Courts to redress and contest 
the Code Enforcement violations against him.”  According to Budzash, the defendants’ 
actions, inter alia, deprived him of his right to due process under the  Fourteenth 
Amendment, and retaliated against him in violation of his rights under the First 
Amendment.  Count II alleged a conspiracy to violate his civil rights in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3).  In addition, Budzash alleged five other state law claims against 
various defendants. 
  The defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that Budzash’s claims were barred 
by the statute of limitations.  Budzash, through counsel, asserted that his claims were 
viable under the “continuing violation” doctrine.   
The District Court determined that the continuing violation doctrine was not 
applicable.  The Court reasoned that the allegations relating to 2002 and 2003 were 
                                                                                                                                                             
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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unrelated to the allegations regarding 2007 and 2008.  It pointed out that there was a 
“definite break in the acts alleged following the 2003 litigation.”  Additionally, the Court 
concluded that Budzash “was aware of the wrongfulness of these actions and should have 
acted at that time and within the appropriate limitations period by filing a § 1983 claim.”  
Although the claim based on the failure to obtain a soil removal permit occurred during 
the limitations period, the Court dismissed the claim stating that if Budzash “believes that 
the 2008 soil removal litigation warrants relief and forms a basis for a §1983 claim, then 
[Budzash] may bring a separate cause of action on that basis, so long as it complies with 
applicable statutes of limitations.”  The Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claims. 
 This timely appeal followed.  Budzash’s pro se brief does not cite any legal 
authority.  Instead, Budzash argues that he established a continuing violation.    
Normally, the statute of limitations is a defense that cannot serve as a basis for granting 
relief under Rule 12(b)(6).2
                                                 
2 The applicable statute of limitations for Budzash’s civil rights claims is governed by the 
state statute for personal injury actions.  Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).  
Accordingly, the limitations period is two years.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.    
  Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 
1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).  In Oshiver, however, we recognized that “an exception is made 
where the complaint facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the 
affirmative defense clearly appears on the face of the pleading.”  Id.  In Cowell v. Palmer 
Township, 263 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001), we considered the  applicability of the continuing 
violation doctrine in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion. There, the plaintiffs alleged in a 
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complaint filed in 1999 that the imposition of two municipal liens in 1992 and 1993 
violated their right to due process.  The plaintiffs argued that their claim was not time 
barred based on the continuing violation doctrine.  Id. at 291.  We disagreed.  We 
acknowledged that the doctrine is an “‘equitable exception to the timely filing 
requirement[.]’”  Id. at 292 (quoting West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 
1995)).   We instructed that “[i]n order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant’s conduct is ‘more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic 
acts.’” Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292  (quoting West, 45 F.3d at 755). We further noted that  
courts should consider at least three factors: (1) subject matter-whether the 
violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect 
them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency-whether the acts are recurring 
or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-
whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the 
plaintiff’s awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the 
consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing 
intent to discriminate. 
  
Id. at 292.  Cowell instructs that the focus is on the “‘continual unlawful acts, not 
continual ill effects from an original violation.’”  Id. at 293 (quoting Ocean Acres Ltd. v. 
Dare Cnty. Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
We agree with the District Court that the claims based on the allegations in the 
Complaint regarding 2002 and 2003 are time-barred.  There was a “definite break” 
between the citations issued in 2002 and 2003 and the issuance of the traffic citation in 
2007 and the soil removal citation in 2008.  Budzash focuses on the delays in the 
prosecution of the 2003 citations, which took more than a year, to tie the 2002-2003 
events with the 2007-2008 events.  But we conclude that the delays  in adjudicating the 
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code citations were simply the ill effects of the original citations.  Cowell, 263 F.3d at 
293.  In our view, the issuance of 13 citations should have “trigger[ed]” Budzash’s 
“awareness of and duty to assert his[] rights” in a timely fashion.  Cowell, 263 F.3d at 
295.  Because he failed to timely assert his rights, we agree with the District Court that 
the claims arising in 2002 and 2003 were time-barred and were appropriately dismissed. 
 The dismissal of the claims based on the facts which allegedly occurred in 2007 
and 2008, however, is puzzling as the statute of limitations obviously did not bar these 
claims.  For that reason, we will reverse this portion of the District Court’s ruling and 
remand for further proceedings.3  We express no view as to the nature of Budzash’s 
claims or whether his claims are sufficiently alleged as to each of the defendants.4
                                                 
3    We received an eleventh hour motion from Budzash to file a supplemental brief.  We 
deny that motion. 
  
4   We note that Budzash does not allege, and cannot establish, a § 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim.  A plaintiff basing a § 1983 claim on an allegedly malicious 
prosecution must establish both the common law elements of the tort and a “deprivation 
of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”  
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009).  Budzash does not 
allege that he was deprived of his liberty as a result of the code violations.   
